REPORT V.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE
THIRD SESSION.
GENEVA, OCTOBER 1921

REPORT
ON THE
DISINFECTION OF WOOL
INFECTED WITH ANTHRAX SPORES

ITEM V OF THE AGENDA

GENEVA
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE
1921

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PRELIMINARY NOTE.

In the Introductory Note to the Questionnaire sent out by the International Labour Office in connection with each item on the Agenda of the Third Session of the International Labour Conference, it was explained that, when the International Labour Office had received the replies to each Questionnaire and was thereby informed of the opinions of the Governments, it would proceed to draw up a General Report together with suggestions for Draft Conventions or Recommendations.

The present Report accordingly contains the replies received from the Governments, a general summary of these replies and an indication of the conclusions to which they would appear to lead, and, finally, the text of a draft for a Convention which may serve as a basis for discussion by the Conference.

In this Report are incorporated the replies of the following Governments: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czecho-Slovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, India, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Roumania, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

It is intended to include replies of the Governments received subsequent to 23 July in a supplementary Report which will be distributed later.
In addition to the present Report the International Labour Office will prepare a summary of the available documentary and statistical information relating to this item of the Agenda, which will be distributed immediately before the opening of the Conference on 25 October next.
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INTRODUCTION.

The manner in which the question of the disinfection of wool infected with anthrax spores was raised and dealt with at the Washington Conference, in the form of a Recommendation, has been set forth in the Questionnaire issued by the International Labour Office on this item of the Agenda. Attention was also drawn therein to the fact that the Washington Conference adopted the proposal of its Commission on Unhealthy Processes as to a Recommendation in regard to anthrax on the understanding that the question of the adoption of a Draft Convention dealing with anthrax should be placed on the Agenda of the next Conference. In consequence, the Governing Body of the International Labour Office decided, on 25 March 1920, to include the disinfection of wool infected with anthrax spores on the Agenda of the Third Session of the International Labour Conference.

The text of the above-mentioned Questionnaire, which was communicated to the Members of the International Labour Organisation, was as follows:

1. Does your Government consider that the Conference should adopt a Draft Convention to provide for the compulsory disinfection of wool exported from one country to another?

2. Does your Government recognise that, as a result of the enquiries that have been made, disinfection of wool must be organised in the ports of exporting countries?

If not, where and how should disinfection take place?
3. Does your Government contemplate the prohibition of the transport and importation of non-disinfected wool?

4. Would your Government agree to delegate to an International Commission the duty
   (a) of drawing up a schedule of the most suspected woods and of fixing the order of priority for disinfection;
   (b) of fixing the ports where disinfection should take place;
   (c) of organising the necessary financial and technical dispositions;
   (d) of effecting the supervision necessary in order to ensure that disinfection is strictly carried out;
   (e) of keeping abreast of the progress of science in order to be able to apply, in case of need, more efficient or more perfectly adapted methods;
   (f) of collecting and disseminating all available information regarding the methods of prevention of anthrax adopted by individual States?

   If your Government does not accept the idea of an International Organisation, what satisfactory solution does it propose?

5. How should the International Commission be composed?
   Does your Government accept the idea of having representatives of Governments, employers and workers, the representation to be divided equally between importing and exporting countries?

   Note. — In order to facilitate the work preparatory to the meeting of the Conference in 1921, the Office would be grateful to receive the following information:
   What legislative or other measures are at present in operation in your country, having as their object the diminution or suppression of the dangers of infection from wool infected by anthrax spores in the various industries manufacturing wool?
   What measures has your Government taken or been requested to take with regard to anthrax amongst animals, with the object
of preventing the spreading of the disease by animal products and thereby diminishing the dangers of infection in industry?

Please give the texts of these measures.

What is the extent of the disease and the mortality therefrom in the various trades? Give statistics from the earliest date of compilation with especial reference to the following:

(1) Number of cases of cutaneous anthrax and of internal anthrax;

(2) List of industries, trade-groups and occupations in which these cases have occurred; and, for each industry, the various processes. (Classify them in order of decreasing dangerousness.)

(3) List of wools showing the relation between the place of the origin of the wool and the intensity of infection with anthrax spores (in order of decreasing dangerousness).

(4) Percentage of anthrax cases which have occurred in the manipulation of wool compared with the total number of cases.
CHAPTER I.

OPINIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTS IN REPLY TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

The following are the opinions of the Governments as expressed in the replies which have been received by the International Labour Office in time for inclusion in this Report. They are arranged under each different heading of the Questionnaire in alphabetical order.

QUESTION No. 1.

Does your Government consider that the Conference should adopt a Draft Convention to provide for the compulsory disinfection of wool exported from one country to another?

AUSTRIA.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The Austrian Government is of the opinion that the Conference should adopt an International Draft Convention for the prevention of infection by anthrax by the efficient disinfection of wool in cases where it is not certified by an impartial Government authority that the wool comes from healthy animals."

The Austrian Government gives the following reasons for this reply:

"If the animals themselves could be protected against anthrax by inoculation and other preventive measures, all possibility of infection of persons would be prevented and
the disinfection of wool would not be necessary. Individual States should do everything they can in this way to lessen the danger of anthrax. As, however, it cannot be expected that at the present time such measures can be carried through everywhere with complete success, it is necessary also to take measures to protect human beings from the danger of infection. The methods of disinfection of wool which are known at the present time may be regarded as efficient, but their disadvantage is that they not only destroy the horny substance and thus cause considerable deterioration of the wool, but also cause the wool to become matted and therefore unsuitable for some kinds of spinning, especially for the manufacture of worsted. These very serious disadvantages for the industry require that disinfection should only be made compulsory in cases where it is not rendered superfluous by reliable evidence that the wool in question comes from healthy animals from a district which is not affected by the disease and that there is therefore no danger of infection for human beings.

Thus the only wool which would have to be disinfected is wool which is not provided with a certificate of freedom from infection. Such certificates could, of course, only be regarded as valid if it is certain that they were issued by experienced and impartial organisations, so that there is no reason to suspect their accuracy. The safest method would be that such certificates should only be issued by Government organisations or expert organisations under Government supervision and that the conditions under which certificates might be issued should be carefully defined. There should be no great difficulty in providing such certificates, as the production of certificates of freedom from infection is at present customary in trade in imported wool.

Whenever no certificate of freedom from infection can be produced, or when the certificate cannot be regarded as absolutely reliable, disinfection of the wool by an efficient process, damaging it as little as possible, should be declared absolutely necessary."

**Belgium.**

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"Our reply is, generally speaking, a negative one. It appears to us to be useless and onerous to pre-
scribe the compulsory disinfection of all imported wools. Compulsion can evidently only be justified in the case of suspected wools. ”

In their explanatory note to the answers the Belgian Government say:

“The investigations of the industrial medical officers show that not a single case of infection by anthrax contracted during employment has been discovered in the Belgian woollen industry. This fortunate situation is explained by the fact that, up to the present, only superior quality wools have been employed in Belgium and that the equipment of our undertakings is ill adapted to the manipulation of suspected wools.

CANADA.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

“No; some countries are comparatively free from anthrax, and the disinfection of wool produced under such conditions seems unnecessary.”

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

“The Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic is of opinion that an International Convention providing for the compulsory disinfection of wool exported from one country to another should be concluded.”

In its notes on the present situation with regard to anthrax in Czecho-Slovakia, the Government says:

“.... Anthrax is unknown in Czecho-Slovakia amongst the workers in the woollen industry; this disease only occurs—and then only very rarely—amongst the workers who manipulate horsehair and skins.”
The reply of the Government is as follows:

"A Convention providing for the compulsory disinfection of all wool destined to be exported would be desirable on condition that it were limited to those countries which have not taken effective steps to prevent the export or home consumption of wool derived from animals infected with anthrax."

FINLAND.

The Finnish Government considers that the Conference should adopt a Draft Convention concerning the disinfection of wool exported from one country to another.

In the introductory note to the answers the Government says:

"It is impossible to compile exact statistics of the anthrax cases in Finland since the notification of these cases is not compulsory. As, however, the country is small, most of the cases which have occurred amongst the working population have come to notice. Such cases have been very rare and have been contracted from infected skins. In this respect, wool has not been very important and, in fact, the industry which uses raw wool is relatively little developed in Finland. During the ten years 1911-1920 only 10,557,161 kilogrammes of wool were imported.

Whilst, therefore, the danger of anthrax contracted from raw wool has been very small up to the present as far as Finland is concerned, the Government nevertheless accepts the conclusions of the International Labour Office with regard to the disinfection of wool infected with anthrax spores."

FRANCE.

The Minister of Labour of the French Republic, after obtaining the views of the other Ministers concerned,
submitted the Questionnaire, together with the results of the enquiries undertaken, to the Industrial Health Commission. The reply of the Commission, with which the Minister of Labour associates himself, is as follows:

"Although this question has a very limited interest as far as France is concerned in consequence of the rarity of cases of anthrax contracted through wool, the Commission expresses the opinion that France might nevertheless associate itself with the examination of a Draft International Convention, provided:

(1) That the measures proposed in the Convention would not involve France in expenditure out of proportion to the narrow margin of risk to be guarded against;

(2) That disinfection should be limited to wools suspect by reason of their countries of origin, such countries of origin to be enumerated in the Convention itself;

(3) That the measures prescribed should not have as a practical consequence the establishment of a monopoly of exportation of the wools concerned by certain ports dependant upon Foreign Powers;

(4) That effective measures should be taken to guarantee the disinfection of wool in the order of arrival at the ports of embarkation in such a way as to place the various importing countries on a footing of equality.

As regards the supervision of the application of the Convention, the Commission declares itself opposed to the creation of a special organisation which would entail expenditure out of proportion to the object to be achieved and expresses the opinion
that supervision might with advantage be entrusted to an existing international organisation, more particularly to the International Public Health Office."

**GERMANY.**

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The German Government is of opinion that compulsory disinfection can only be considered in the case of wool derived from countries where anthrax has been proved to be prevalent on a large scale. It does not appear to be necessary to provide for the disinfection of wool coming from countries which are free from anthrax. Consequently the German Government will in all probability agree to a Draft International Convention which provides for the compulsory disinfection of wool derived from countries where it is recognised that anthrax is prevalent to a considerable extent."

The German Government gives the following reasons for this reply:

"As may be seen from the statistics forwarded .... only two cases of anthrax occurred during the period 1910 to 1919 inclusive in the undertakings manipulating wool in Germany. Infection in one case was due to Turkish wool and in the second case to mohair. In earlier years eight other cases of infection with anthrax contracted by the manipulation of raw wool were reported. As far as could be ascertained at the time, all these cases were due to the manipulation of Asiatic wools, camel hair or mohair. On the other hand, in no single case has infection been traced with certainty to the use of wools derived from South Africa, Australia or the La Plata States. The greater part of the wool used in Germany, probably 99 per cent, comes from these latter countries.

It is impossible to conceive what purpose would be served by the disinfection of wool exported from these countries.
which obviously do not suffer from anthrax. On the contrary, the process of disinfection, involving as it does the washing of the wool, would make sorting an extremely difficult, if not impossible, process. For German industry careful sorting is absolutely essential. In these conditions it is clear that a Convention which prescribed the disinfection of wool exported by Australia, the Cape and the La Plata States, would serve no useful purpose and would seriously damage the German woollen industry.

On the other hand, it would appear that the disinfection of wool coming from countries where anthrax has been proved to be prevalent is urgently to be recommended in order to safeguard the health of the workers engaged in manipulating such wool. Wools of Asiatic origin, including mohair and camel hair, call for attention first of all. The German Government would therefore be able to agree to a Convention which prescribed the disinfection of wool originating from countries which are recognised as suffering from anthrax.

Generally speaking it should be remarked that, as shown by the statistics, the question of infection with anthrax through the medium of wool is of relatively small importance in Germany. The majority of cases of anthrax occur in agriculture and amongst butchers, skinners, tanners, horsehair spinners and brushmakers, and regulations for the protection of these classes of workers are in part in force. The statistics show that the number of cases of anthrax in wool-combing undertakings is extraordinarily small in comparison with the number of cases in the above-named industries. It is to be concluded therefore that there is no urgent need for the making of special regulations for the disinfection of wool as far as Germany is concerned.

**GREAT BRITAIN.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"Yes. Experience has shown that the danger to workers engaged in handling wool infected with anthrax spores cannot be adequately prevented by precautionary measures, however elaborate, so long as the infection remains in the material. Regu-
lations requiring elaborate precautions to be taken for the protection of the workers have been in force in the wool and hair factories of Great Britain for many years, but they have not succeeded in eliminating the disease. The subject was fully investigated by a Home Office Committee (including representatives of employers and operatives in the wool trade) which reported in 1918. This Committee unanimously recommended that the system of precautionary regulations in the factories should be abandoned and that dangerous materials should be disinfected before admission into the United Kingdom. They further recommended that all materials derived from certain areas should be regarded as infected or likely to be infected with anthrax. Experiments carried out by the Committee have established a reliable method of disinfection which does not damage the material and can be used on a commercial scale."

Greece.

The Greek Government, in a long memorandum which deals in great detail with the position with regard to anthrax in the principal countries of the world and with the methods which have been adopted to combat the disease, come to the conclusion "that, before submitting the question of the compulsory disinfection of wool for discussion by the International Labour Conference at Geneva, it would be necessary to appoint an International Commission for the purpose of studying all the technical and economic details of the problem, in order to
avoid inequality in commercial competition and also to render more certain the general application of the principle of the disinfection of wool."

In arriving at this decision the Greek Government have been influenced by certain considerations which are here presented in a summarised form:

In the first place they point out that "Greece, in consequence of the relatively insignificant degree of development of its woollen industry, in consequence of the importation of manufactured wool, and, finally, in consequence of the abundance of indigenous wool, has no need to resort, as far as the importation of its raw material is concerned, to countries ravished by anthrax, as, for example, India, Persia or Japan. Greece imports raw wool mainly from Russia, Roumania and Serbia. Nevertheless, the importation of wool (and also of skins), which is not accompanied by a certificate showing that anthrax is not endemic in its country of origin, is prohibited. The same prohibition exists also for Greek wool, which, if destined for export, must be accompanied by a certificate delivered by a competent veterinary authority stating that no cases of anthrax have occurred in the district from which the wool is derived during the preceding three months. With regard to the manipulation of wool (and of skins), there are at present no special regulations concerning preventive measures against anthrax.

Preventive measures against anthrax, as far as wool is concerned, can evidently not be based on the vaccination of the flocks for various reasons. In our opinion, effective preventive measures could be based on:

1. The adoption of strict international regulations concerning the preventive measures to be taken in the woollen and tanning industries by all the States Members of the League of Nations, in view of the fact that the existing regulations differ very much in the various countries, or, as in Greece, are non-existent.

2. The compulsory disinfection of wool for export. This is a radical measure, but is attended by both technical and economic difficulties.

The system of disinfection, which was discovered after long experiment by a special Commission in Great Britain, can be considered perfect from the scientific point of view,
but the expenses of founding and working disinfecting stations would fall unequally upon the various States, in proportion to the extent to which they export wool and their means of transport to the disinfecting station. The possibility of founding such stations in countries which import wool, in view of the fact that wool may be derived from countries where disinfection has not taken place from causes of force majeure or from unforeseen causes, should also be considered.

The Greek Government further point out that "in spite of its disadvantages, the sterilisation of wool by steam is the most practical process. It is not only the most simple and the most direct in its action, but also the most efficacious, provided always that the bales of wool are not compressed by hydraulic presses, since the duration of sterilisation does not only depend upon temperature but also upon the volume of the bales and the degree of their compression."

The methods of disinfection employed "should be efficacious, of immediate effect, inexpensive, and innocuous as far as the subsequent employment of the raw material is concerned. Disinfection should be carried out especially in the exporting ports, and not in the importing ports, in order to avoid infection during disembarkation and during transport to the consuming countries. This necessity has been proved in several cases. Consequently, importation of animal raw materials from countries where cases of anthrax are suspected should be prohibited, unless a certificate drawn up by the competent Consular Authority certifies the absence of such cases in the exporting countries, or unless the raw materials in question have been previously disinfected in accordance with the prescribed regulations."

Finally, the Greek Government consider that "the technical experts should give their attention not only to the disinfection of wool, but also to that of skins, which are an equally dangerous source of infection by anthrax spores, especially in the case of skins derived from China, India, and other Asiatic countries, as well as African and South American countries."

**India.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"The Government of India doubt whether the
International Labour Conference would be justified in adopting a Draft Convention to provide for the compulsory disinfection of wool exported from one country to another."

In support of this opinion, the Government of India put forward a series of considerations which may be summarised as follows:

In the first place it is held that the Draft Convention would go beyond the necessities of the case, since the Report of the British Departmental Committee established that wool exported from Australia and New Zealand is practically free from anthrax infection.

In the second place, the Government of India consider that it might reasonably be held that a Draft Convention on the lines suggested would be premature. Compulsory disinfection has hardly passed the experimental stage even in England and it is submitted that it would be preferable to wait until the results of this experiment have been ascertained and it has been possible to weigh the measure of protection afforded to wool workers against the interference in trade and the cost of disinfection before the principle of compulsory disinfection is adopted by the International Labour Conference.

Further, the Government of India consider that more information is required as to the incidence of anthrax among wool workers. The most careful enquiries are stated to have been made in India through the Local Governments, but they have not made it possible to ascertain that anthrax is a serious danger to wool workers.

Finally, the Government of India point out that the United Kingdom is the world's market for the classes of wool which are said to be dangerous. The principle of compulsory disinfection has been accepted in the United Kingdom. If it is successful, other countries which buy wool produced in infected countries can protect themselves by continuing to buy in the United Kingdom and it is suggested that nothing further is required at present.
JAPAN.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"In Japan no definite case of anthrax ascribable to wool infected with anthrax spores has yet been established. Moreover, there is much room left for further study of the methods of disinfection and at present it is doubtful whether it is possible to carry out complete disinfection. It is not considered necessary, therefore, to take immediate action in providing for compulsory disinfection by a Convention, but it is highly desirable in the interest of the well-being of mankind that disinfection of wool should be carried out in the exporting countries."

NETHERLANDS.

NOTE. — The Dutch Government, in communicating the replies to the Questionnaires, desired to remark that these replies represent the standpoint adopted by the Minister concerned in relation to the subjects dealt with. The Government, however, reserve the right to depart from that standpoint when dealing with Draft Conventions and Recommendations which may result from the Conference.

The reply is as follows:

"Although no cases of anthrax have ever been known to occur amongst the industrial population of the Netherlands as a result of the manipulation of wool, the Government sees no objection to the adoption by the Conference of a Draft Convention prescribing the compulsory disinfection of wool infected with anthrax spores, provided that the data furnished by other States prove its necessity and provided that the Convention apply exclusively to countries subject to the disease."
NOTE. — The Norwegian Government states that the replies have been formulated by a Committee of persons composed of the Delegates and Technical Advisers to the Conference and of other persons with expert knowledge of the questions at issue, and that the Government is not in a position to give its final opinion upon the various questions asked.

The reply of the Committee is as follows:

"Compulsory disinfection would increase the price of manufactured woollen goods. Moreover, it must also be taken into account that the quality of the wool is changed by disinfection, a fact of importance in certain manufacturing processes. Hence our reply to the above question is as follows:

If a country has set up an entirely effective system of supervision as regards its domestic animals we do not consider that the proposal, the effect of which would be to increase the price of both raw and manufactured materials, is necessary. On the other hand, as regards countries which have not organised a satisfactory system of supervision our answer to the question is in the affirmative."

POLAND.

The Polish Government will not oppose the adoption of a Draft Convention which is based upon the prolonged experience of the countries principally interested.

In its reply the Government says:

"Polish industry does not handle wools derived from countries where anthrax is prevalent. Poland imports washed wools from Australia, Argentine, South Africa and Great Britain which are not dangerous from the point of view of
infection. Anthrax is also very rare amongst the flocks in Poland.

In these circumstances the question of effective measures to prevent the infection of workers and others by infected wool has not been sufficiently examined in Poland in order to enable the Government to come to a definite decision at present with regard to the detailed solutions proposed in the Questionnaire.

Since, however, the question is of international interest, Poland will not oppose the adoption of a Draft Convention concerning the disinfection of wool, which is based upon the prolonged experience of the countries principally interested."

ROUMANIA.

The Roumanian Government answers this question in the affirmative.

_In its note on the reply the Government says:_

"Since the woollen industry in Roumania is very small we have no legislation concerning the disinfection of wool used in industry. Statistics regarding the number of cases and deaths from anthrax are also wanting, but the number is very small in the various branches, even as the list of industries is small."

SPAIN.

_The reply of the Government is as follows:_

"There is at present no legislation in Spain relating especially to the disinfection of wool infected with anthrax spores, but a Draft International Convention, which would render compulsory the disinfection of wool for export, would be very serviceable not only as regards the danger of anthrax but also, since wool like all other textile materials may become the carrier of pathogenic germs (cholera, bubonic plague, yellow fever, etc.), because it would diminish the likelihood of epidemics."
Sweden.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"If there be taken into consideration only the experience that has so far been gained in Sweden with regard to the danger of the spread of anthrax infection by means of imported wool, there would seem to be no reason to recommend a Convention with the scope of the one now under consideration. But as the danger in question is very marked in other countries, and as it is not impossible that changed conditions may expose us thereto, the Swedish Government does not consider that it should take up an altogether negative attitude towards a suitably framed Convention on the subject.

According to the terms of the question before us, disinfection would be compulsory in all cases where wool is conveyed from one country to another — that is regardless of the need of disinfection in any particular case. As disinfection must naturally increase the price of the commodity, and also seems to involve certain risks with regard to the quality of the commodity, it seems — especially with the experience that we have in Sweden — as if import without disinfection should be permissible in such cases where it can be shown in a satisfactory manner that the wool must be regarded as free from anthrax infection, e.g. with regard to its origin in regions where anthrax has not occurred for a long time, or where the arrangements against the spread of anthrax infection inspire complete confidence."
The reply of the Government is as follows:

"We are of opinion that the Conference might adopt a Draft International Convention providing for the compulsory disinfection of wool but expressly limiting such disinfection to dangerous wools. Wools which offer no risk of infection, i.e. those of South America, Australia, the Cape and Europe, should be excepted from the sphere of application of the Convention. It would consequently be necessary to draw up a list of wools which are to be considered dangerous from the point of view of anthrax infection and which ought to be disinfected."

The reply of the Swiss Government is accompanied by a series of considerations which are here given in a summarised form:

In explaining their reasons for the above decision the Swiss Government refer to the evidence presented by the employers in the Swiss woollen industry. It would appear from the evidence that not a single case of anthrax contracted by a worker in the woollen industry has been reported. Moreover, the wools employed in Switzerland are imported exclusively from the countries cited by the Government in the foregoing answer.

The evidence also refers to an important technical difficulty which would arise in Switzerland in connection with the method of disinfection described in the Questionnaire sent out by the International Labour Office. It is customary in the Swiss woollen industry to sort the wool before washing and it is contended that the washing and squeezing which are indispensable preliminaries to the process of disinfection would so tear the fleeces and mingle the different qualities of wool that effective sorting would be rendered impossible. "Sorting, however, is of primary importance for those industries which spin the finer qualities of wool. In reality the whole production of the mill depends upon it. Now in Switzerland the woollen industry has specialised in the manufacture of fine wools and to take away the possibility of sorting would
be equivalent to compelling the industry to abandon its speciality and would imperil its very existence.

The Swiss Government further refer to the Report of the British Departmental Committee which enquired into the question of precautions for preventing danger of infection from anthrax in the manipulation of wool, goat hair and camel hair, and they find that the views of the Committee coincide with those of the Swiss woollen manufacturers on the following points:

(1) Wools imported from Australia, South America, Europe and the Cape are for all practical purpose free from the danger of infection;

(2) Wools derived from these countries are first quality wools in the manipulation of which sorting is an operation of primary importance — an operation which becomes impossible if the wool has first of all to undergo a process of disinfection which tears the fleeces and mingles the different qualities;

(3) An international convention providing for the disinfection of wool and the prohibition of the transport of non-disinfected wool should apply only to wools which are recognised as dangerous.

In face of these considerations the Swiss Government come to the conclusion that the best solution would be "for the next Conference to appoint a Commission, the task of which would not only be to prepare a list of dangerous wools but also to reconsider thoroughly the whole question of the compulsory disinfection of wool infected with anthrax spores and to draw up a Draft Convention in final form. We do not believe that a proposal which will duly take into account all the aspects of the question can be drawn up with all the serenity necessary between now and the opening of the next Conference and be examined thoroughly by the Conference itself. The adoption of this proposal would evidently involve a certain delay in the preparation of the Convention. Nevertheless, we do not consider that the resulting loss of time would be of great importance. On the contrary, we believe that it would be fully compensated by the advantage of allowing all parties concerned to examine the question in all its aspects and to present a Draft Convention upon which agreement will already have been reached in principle. Our proposal has, therefore, in no way the object of delaying the settlement of the ques-
tion but is formulated purely and simply in the interest of a rational solution of the difficulties."

QUESTION No. 2.

Does your Government recognise that, as a result of the enquiries that have been made, disinfection of wool must be organised in the ports of exporting countries? If not, where and how should disinfection take place?

AUSTRIA.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The Austrian Government is of the opinion that disinfection, in those cases in which it should take place according to the reply to Question 1, should be carried out in the exporting ports or stations. If the wool cannot be disinfected in these places it should be disinfected in the importing ports or stations."

The following reasons for this decision are given by the Austrian Government:

"It is of course clear that the fewer persons have to deal with the dangerous animal products the less is the danger of anthrax. Thus the destruction of the anthrax spores should take place as early as possible after the slaughter of the diseased animals. It would of course be possible to carry out disinfection in the large slaughter houses. In the small ones, however, it would probably not be practicable to do this immediately after slaughter. It therefore appears that the best method would be to carry out disinfection in those places where considerable quantities of animal products which it is proposed to work up are collected, i.e. in the stations of export. Disinfection before loading of ships or railway trucks has two advantages: it is easier to supervise and it protects the men who load the goods at the places of export."
BELGIUM.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"We consider that the system of disinfection should be organised in those countries which produce suspected wools and in the ports from which these products are exported."

CANADA.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The disinfection should be carried out as near the point of infection as possible."

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

The Czecho-Slovak Government "considers that the disinfection of wool should be organised in the exporting ports."

DENMARK.

The reply of the Government is as follows: 

"Disinfection should be carried out, in the case of the above-mentioned countries (see reply to Question No. 1), at the exporting ports."

FINLAND.

The reply is in the affirmative.

FRANCE.

See reply to Question No. 1.
GERMANY.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The German Government is of the opinion that disinfection of wool should take place in the exporting ports of countries where it is recognised that anthrax is prevalent on a large scale."

On this point the Government remarks in its explanatory note:

"There appears to be hardly anything to be added to the clear and convincing reasoning contained in the memorandum of the International Labour Office on the point."

GREAT BRITAIN.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"Disinfection should take place at the earliest stage possible in the course of the conveyance of the material from the producing to the consuming areas, and preferably in the producing or exporting countries if conditions permit.

If, and in so far as, this is impracticable, the disinfection should be carried out at selected ports in the importing countries. Materials likely to be infected should not be allowed to enter except at such ports, and should only be allowed to enter there subject to the condition that they are conveyed under official control to the disinfecting station for disinfection.

Pending the establishment of disinfecting stations in the exporting countries, and for the purpose of determining the best arrangements for carrying out the method of disinfection recommended by the Committee, a disinfecting station has been estab-
lished in the United Kingdom at Liverpool. It will commence with some of the most dangerous materials (including Egyptian wool).”

**INDIA.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

“The Government of India are not prepared to admit that, if the principle of compulsory disinfection of wool is accepted, the disinfection must be organised in the ports of exporting countries. On the contrary, they are entirely opposed to this suggestion.”

The reasons advanced by the Government of India in support of this opinion may be summarised as follows:

According to the Report of the British Departmental Committee, dangerous materials come from South Africa, including Natal, from Peru, from Egypt and from Central, Southern and Western Asia. In the last-named category are included East Indian wools, goat hair and cashmere, Persian and Syrian wool, Van mohair, Turkey mohair, Russian cashmere and goat hair. These materials are drawn from an enormously wide area, and they find their way, chiefly to the United Kingdom, by a variety of routes. It cannot be expected that disinfecting stations will be established in all the ports from which these wools may be despatched, and the British Committee admitted that it might be necessary to establish disinfecting stations at British ports to deal with wool which escapes treatment in the exporting countries. The Government of India have no doubt as to the correctness of this opinion.

It would be useless for the International Labour Conference to frame a Convention that exporting countries should be responsible for the disinfection of wool before export unless that Convention were agreed to by, and made effective in, all exporting countries. The Government of India see no hope of this result and they take strong exception to a Convention which would be likely to command only partial acceptance.

The principle of disinfection before export could not
be applied in India without grave dislocation of the export trade in wool. The inevitable result would be to divert to alternative routes the wool which now comes down from Central Asia for export via Indian ports. Moreover, the objection does not only apply to wool in transit through India, but also to wool produced in India. The Government of India are advised that if wool is disinfected at all in India it should be disinfected at central stations in the interior where large sums have already been spent in installing pressing machines. This solution is, however, clearly impossible for the reasons pointed out by the British Departmental Committee, that disinfection is a highly technical process. Stations would therefore have to be established at Bombay and Karachi, and to this proposal there are serious practical objections.

The Government of India, therefore, object strongly to the adoption by the Conference of a Convention embodying the principle of compulsory disinfection before export. They consider that it should be left to importing countries to make the necessary arrangements for disinfecting on arrival either all wool or wool from countries where anthrax is known to be prevalent.

**Japan.**

*See reply to Question No 1.*

**Netherlands.**

*NOTE. — See Note on page 22.*

*The reply is as follows:*

"If the discussions at Geneva lead to an affirmative answer to the first question, then the Netherlands Government would consider that disinfection of wool in the ports of the exporting countries is to be recommended."

**Norway.**

*NOTE. — See Note on page 23.*

*The reply of the Committee is as follows:*

"Anthrax is an animal disease. Hence, in order
to fight the disease effectively, it is rational to combat it amongst the animals. In countries where it is considered impossible to carry out repression on these lines, it is desirable that infected wool should pass through the hands of as few people as possible. Therefore our reply is:

Precautionary measures should be taken as early as possible. In countries which have no effective supervision over their domestic animals the wool should be disinfected at the ports from which they are exported. These ports are the only places at which the whole of the wool for export can be accumulated."

**ROUMANIA.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"The disinfection of wool should be carried out preferably at the ports, frontier stations or in the localities in which disinfesting plant, constructed on the most efficient and least injurious system, is already installed."

**SPAIN.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"It would appear natural that disinfection should take place in the ports of exportation, since this is the only means of avoiding infection amongst the workers on board ship."

**SWEDEN.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"So far as disinfection ought to take place, it would undoubtedly seem — amongst other things
for the prevention of the spread of infection during transport — to be most expedient that the disinfection should take place in the commercial centres from which the wool is exported.”

**SWITZERLAND.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

“It would appear from the researches which have been made that the disinfection of dangerous wools should be carried out at the exporting ports. The reasons enumerated in the Questionnaire appear to us to recommend this solution.”

**QUESTION No. 3.**

Does your Government contemplate the prohibition of the transport and importation of non-disinfected wool?

**AUSTRIA.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

“If a Convention in the sense of Question 1 is concluded it might be possible to consider the prohibition of the import of wool which has no certificate of freedom from infection and has not been disinfected.”

*With regard to this reply the Austrian Government makes the following remarks:*

“Reference must be made in this connection to the following provisions of a Decree of the former Royal and Imperial Ministry of Agriculture of 20 December 1909, No. *4537* 1/6*87* concerning the import and export of domestic animals and animal products, which is still in force:
The import and transit of raw hides and skins (raw, undressed, salted, limed or tarred) and of raw, undried bones, horns, hoofs and claws, bone meal, intestines, guts and bladders, not of extra-European origin, may not take place unless the raw materials in question are provided with a certificate of healthy origin. These certificates must contain an exact description of the goods, their place of origin and destination and the name and address of the sender.

As regards the import and transit of other animal raw materials, evidence of healthy origin must also be produced. If such evidence is not contained in the papers accompanying the goods, import or transit may be permitted if there are no serious objections on the part of the veterinary authorities.

These certificates could be issued by the Government veterinary authorities or otherwise, and confirmed by the competent Austrian Consulates, which would vouch for their correctness. They might also be issued by the competent Austrian Consulates themselves.

In the case of dangerous outbreaks of disease in foreign countries, special import prohibitions or restrictions would of course have to be issued in virtue of already existing legislation as long as there was any danger of the disease being introduced.

Goods of extra-European origin may not, according to law, be imported or admitted in transit without a special permit from the Minister of Agriculture to be applied for in each case.

Belgium.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"We do not contemplate the prohibition of the transport of non-disinfected wool in the interior of the country. As far as imports are concerned the prohibition of the importation of non-disinfected wool should be confined to wool of suspected origin."
The reply of the Government is as follows:

"No; the policy of the Government of Canada is contained in the Regulations regarding the Importation of Foreign Wool and Hair."

Czecho-Slovakia.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"Existing legislation in Czecho-Slovakia prohibits the transport and importation of animal raw products derived from animals infected or suspected of infection with anthrax."

Denmark.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"With regard to the export of wool from Denmark see the answer to the first Question. The prohibition of the importation into Denmark of non-disinfected wool from countries which have not taken measures as effective as those taken by Denmark regarding animal products infected with anthrax is to be recommended."

Finland.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The Government reserves the right of deciding on the adoption of this measure."

Germany.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The German Government will probably be prepared to consider the prohibition of the importation
of non-disinfected wool from the countries specified in the answers to Questions Nos. 1 and 2.

*In its explanatory note the Government further states:*

"Up to the present the German Government had not considered the question of taking special measures to prohibit the importation of non-disinfected wool from infected countries as there was no necessity for such action. It will probably be prepared, however, to consider the prohibition of the importation of non-disinfected wool from infected countries."

**GREAT BRITAIN.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"Yes. Power has already been taken in the Anthrax Prevention Act of 1919 to prohibit the importation of dangerous varieties."

**INDIA.**

The reply of the Government of India to the question is in the negative.

**NETHERLANDS.**

*NOTE. — See Note on page 22.*

*The reply is as follows:*

"Since, as has already been said (see reply to Question No. 1), human anthrax contracted through infected wool has never been reported in the Netherlands, the Government does not see the necessity of contemplating a general prohibition such as is indicated in Question No 3. It proposes, however, to introduce a provision relating to the preventive measures to be taken against infection by wool imported from abroad into the new Act concerning contagious diseases which is in course of prepara-
tion. Where there is danger of infection the following measures might be prescribed:

a. Every consignment of wool imported should be accompanied by a certificate of origin.

b. Every consignment of wool arriving from certain countries should be disinfected at the frontier."

**Norway.**

*NOTE. — See Note on page 23.*

*The reply of the Committee is as follows:*

"According to our quarantine legislation, anthrax is not one of the contagious diseases which can be made the subject of an international convention. We do not know whether there is ground for prohibiting importation in the case of countries where anthrax is prevalent without amending the international convention. Hence our reply is as follows:

Yes, provided that the wool does not come from countries—or parts of countries—which give satisfactory guarantees that the exportation of non-disinfected wool is prohibited. It is presupposed that existing international conventions will not present an obstacle to such prohibition."

**Roumania.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"We do not believe that the present is an opportune moment for the immediate prohibition of the transport and importation of wool, even non-disinfected wool, owing to the crisis in the woollen industry."
SPAIN.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"It would appear to follow logically that the Government, taking into account the harm that may result from the non-disinfection of wool, should prohibit the transport of this class of material unless it has been previously disinfected."

SWEDEN.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"As has been intimated in the answer to Question 1, the Swedish Government is prepared to prohibit the import and transport of wool which is not disinfected or concerning which it cannot be shown in a satisfactory way that, even without disinfection, it must be regarded as free from anthrax infection."

SWITZERLAND

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"Switzerland would be disposed to prohibit the importation and transport of non-disinfected wools but only within the limits which it is proposed to give to the Convention. In other words, Switzerland is prepared to prohibit the importation and transport of wools from countries which are recognised as offering risks of infection. On the other hand, it does not intend to take any prohibitive measures with regard to wools derived from countries which are not, for practical purposes, dangerous."
QUESTION No. 4.

Would your Government agree to delegate to an International Commission the duty

(a) of drawing up a schedule of the most suspected wools and of fixing the order of priority for disinfection;

(b) of fixing the ports where disinfection should take place;

(c) of organising the necessary financial and technical dispositions;

(d) of effecting the supervision necessary in order to ensure that disinfection is strictly carried out;

(e) of keeping abreast of the progress of science in order to be able to apply, in case of need, more efficient or more perfectly adapted methods;

(f) of collecting and disseminating all available information regarding the methods of prevention of anthrax adopted by individual States?

If your Government does not accept the idea of an International Organisation, what satisfactory solution does it propose?

Austria.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The Austrian Government agrees that an International Commission should be set up to undertake the functions referred to in Question 4 (a) to (f).

One of the main tasks of the Commission should be to study all means of preventing the spread of the disease among the animals themselves, as well as of removing the danger of the infection of human beings. The investigations undertaken by the Committee or at its request could be made the basis
of proposals to the individual Governments, or of
the conclusion of new international conventions."

BELGIUM.

The Belgian Government replies in the affirma-
tive to parts (a), (b), (e) and (f) of this question.

As regards parts (c) and (d) they reply as fol-

(c). "We consider that the rôle of the Commis-
sion should be limited for the present to examining
and proposing the financial and technical measures
which may be considered indispensable."

(d). "We feel that we must reserve our answer
to the question as to who should effect the neces-
sary supervision."

These replies are accompanied by the following remarks:

"In the last paragraph of the memorandum which pre-
cedes the Questionnaire sent out by the International Labour
Office, the question of the creation of an international or ga-
nisation for the application of the principles adopted is
raised.

These principles are:

(1) In countries producing or consuming raw wool, the
adoption of national measures for the protection of the
workers;

(2) Between producing and consuming countries, the
intervention of international action as soon as the mate-
rials concerned are beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tions.

In other words, it is evidently a question of creating an
international organisation, the expenses of which would
be a common charge, having universal jurisdiction and
entrusted with the practical execution of the processes of
disinfection and, generally, with taking all necessary measures
for the prevention of anthrax.

Leaving aside the objections of a juridical nature which
may be raised by others, better qualified than we, against
this point of view, it does not appear to us opportune at the present moment to propose measures necessarily expensive and of very doubtful utility as far as our country is concerned."

**Canada.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"The Government of Canada would prefer that these objects if desired should be secured by national action rather than by the means proposed in this Question."

**Czecho-Slovakia.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"The Government is of the opinion that the tasks enumerated under the letters (a) to (f) in Question 4 should be entrusted to an International Commission."

**Denmark.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"Control by an International Commission is to be recommended on condition that Denmark is represented thereon. The tasks enumerated under the letters (a), (b), (c) and (f) might be entrusted to such a Commission. The task defined under letter (d) should be carried out in co-operation with the authorities of the country concerned."

**Finland.**

Affirmative reply.

**France.**

*See reply to Question No. 1.*
GERMANY.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The German Government has no objection to make to the detailed measures proposed, provided that they are confined to the countries specified in the answers to Questions Nos. 1 and 2."

GREAT BRITAIN.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"It is possible that an International Advisory Commission may be found desirable in order to advise on the methods of giving effect to the Convention and to ensure the fullest co-operation between the countries mainly concerned, and such a Commission might be able to undertake some of the duties specified in Question 4 — but His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the carrying out of the necessary measures in each country must be left to the Governments themselves."

INDIA.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The Government of India have already expressed the opinion that it should be left to importing countries to make arrangements for the disinfection of wool. In the circumstances they do not support the suggestion that an International Commission should be appointed."

NETHERLANDS.

NOTE. — See Note on page 22.

The reply is as follows:

"It would seem that the appointment of a Com-
mission to carry out the various duties mentioned in the Question is to be recommended."

Norway.

NOTE. — See Note on page 23.

The reply of the Committee is as follows:

"With regard to the proposed organisation it should be remarked that the scientific studies could presumably be made by the hygienic institutions of the various countries. Further, a health organisation was established conjointly with the creation of the League of Nations and it would, therefore, appear preferable that this organisation should undertake the administrative and statistical side of the work. This arrangement would also appear preferable for reasons of economy. Material sufficient for the purpose of throwing light on the question as to which exporting countries should be considered as suspect from the point of view of anthrax infection can be derived from the communications received from the different countries concerning the number of cases of anthrax that have occurred, the sources of contagion and the places of origin of the wool. These suspect countries should be entered in a schedule. We therefore reply to the question as follows:

The various countries have institutions which supervise conditions of health. Consequently, they are in a position to effect the necessary supervision themselves. The administrative application of the provisions of an International Convention, should
one be concluded, could probably be carried out as economically and effectively by a sub-section at the Secretariat of the League of Nations."

**Roumania.**

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"We do not believe that an International Commission is necessary to supervise the disinfection of infected wools. Each country should cause the necessary measures to be prescribed, supervised or executed by its own competent authorities."

**Spain.**

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The nomination of an International Commission for the impartial study of these questions, and having regard to the special conditions of each country, is to be recommended. It would make possible the preparation of a law which would be applied equally by all the States taking part in the Conference and which would remove the constant dangers of epidemics amongst which they at present live. This Commission should, however, proceed with absolute impartiality, without making any distinction between the various kinds of wool, and the international measures and agreements should not unjustifiably damage the industries of any country."

**Sweden.**

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"In the opinion of the Swedish Government an International Commission with the functions here
sketched would be a very large and costly institution. Nor is it improbable that conflicting interests would render its work difficult.

With the arrangement that has been proposed above — that is to say the international prohibition of the import of wool which has not been disinfected or may not otherwise be regarded as free from anthrax infection — it is evident that the exporter would be compelled to take the necessary steps for the disinfection of the wool. But the control over the efficacy of the disinfection, and the above-mentioned certificate as to the freedom of the non-disinfected wool from anthrax spores, might possibly involve the authorities of the importing countries in certain difficulties. In view of this fact and of the desirability of bringing into existence a highly qualified institute of experts for problems bearing on protection against anthrax infection, it would appear that there might be good reasons for setting a small International Commission with the more limited functions here dealt with up. The expenses connected with the work of the Commission should fall on the exporters.”

**Switzerland.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

“Once the principle of the compulsory disinfection of dangerous wools has been laid down in the Convention, it appears to us that, for the purpose of applying the Convention, those countries the wool production of which comes within this category should be asked to state whether they intend to organise
disinfection themselves or whether they prefer that it should be carried out by an international institution. At the present stage we believe that it is to be recommended that the countries concerned should be left to make the executive measures necessitated by the Convention.

With regard to the proposal to draw up a schedule of the most suspected wools and to fix the order of priority for disinfection, we agree that its execution should be entrusted to an International Commission."

See also under the reply to Question No. 1.

QUESTION No. 5.

How should the International Commission be composed? Does your Government accept the idea of having representatives of Governments, employers and workers, the representation to be divided equally between importing and exporting countries?

AUSTRIA.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The Commission should include representatives of the Governments of exporting, importing and manufacturing countries. Suitable provision should be made for the representation of employers and workers, and there should also be members who are expert on medical, veterinary and technical questions."

BELGIUM.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The question of composition appears to us to be subordinate to that of the rôle of the Commis-
sion. As we conceive this rôle, the Commission would be composed essentially of Government Delegates, to whom a few representatives of employers and workers would be added."

**CANADA.**

*See answer to Question No. 4.*

**Czecho-Slovakia.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"As regards the composition of the Commission, the Czecho-Slovak Government considers that Governments, employers and workers should be represented and that the representation should be divided equally between importing and exporting countries."

**Denmark.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"The Board of Health confines itself to proposing that Denmark should be represented on the Commission and should have the right to give competent advice regarding the medical and veterinary questions which may arise."

**Finland.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"The Government considers that importing and exporting countries should be represented on the Commission by employers' and workers' delegates from each country."
GermANY.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The German Government has no special proposals to make with regard to the composition of the Commission but attaches importance to representation on the Commission."

GREAT BRITAIN.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"The Advisory Commission suggested above should consist of representatives of the Governments mainly concerned, whether as exporters or importers."

NETHERLANDS.

NOTE. — See Note on page 22.

The reply is as follows:

"As regards the members of the Commission, the nomination of experts in the woollen trade and in disinfection should be contemplated. In other respects the composition of the Commission might be as suggested in the second part of the Question."

NORWAY.

See reply to Question No. 4.

SWEDEN.

The reply of the Government is as follows:

"A Commission composed as is proposed in the above Question does not appear to be expedient. In view especially of the limitations previously mentioned
with regard to the functions of the Commission, a smaller Commission would seem to be able to act satisfactorily. The members of such a Commission should above all things consist of persons with scientific knowledge of the subject in question. There scarcely appears to be any reason for including in this Commission representatives of employers and workmen."

**Switzerland.**

*The reply of the Government is as follows:*

"In our opinion, the Commission should be composed primarily of representatives of producing and importing countries, scientific experts and practical experts who might be drawn from the woollen industries."
CHAPTER II.

GENERAL SURVEY OF THE QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE REPLIES OF THE GOVERNMENTS.

An analysis of the replies of the Governments given in the foregoing chapter brings out three important points:

(1) Whilst the majority of the Governments which have replied to the Questionnaire are prepared to consider and support a Draft Convention providing for the compulsory disinfection of wool infected with anthrax spores, they are almost unanimously of the opinion that the application of the principle of compulsory disinfection should be definitely limited to wools originating in countries where anthrax is proved to be prevalent. There is almost unanimous opposition to the application of the principle to all wools exported from one country to another, without regard as to whether or not such wools are suspect by reason of their origin.

(2) As regards the supervision of the application of the Convention, the majority of the replies, whilst favourable to the creation of an International Commission, propose that its powers should be of an advisory character, leaving the execution of the necessary measures to the States concerned.

(3) Finally, it would appear both from the replies and the statistics furnished that the problem of
anthrax contracted through the manipulation of raw wool is one of relatively small importance to the majority of the States Members which have replied to the Questionnaire.

It follows, therefore, from these three considerations, that the scheme adumbrated in the Questionnaire must be considerably modified in the draft of the proposed Convention. It is intended in the following review to consider, together with a more detailed examination of the replies, to what extent the proposals of the Questionnaire can be brought into harmony with the views of the Governments.

*Question No. 1.* — The nineteen answers received in reply to this question may be classified as follows; Affirmative 5; Affirmative with reservations 8; No opposition 1; Negative with reservations 1; Negative 2; Further study necessary 2.

The reservations relate almost entirely to the adoption of the principle of the compulsory disinfection of *all* wools exported from one country to another. In view of the relatively small number of cases of anthrax contracted through handling raw wool and the practical innocuousness of certain wools, it is considered that not only would the disinfection of all wools involve disproportionately heavy expenditure and thereby increase the price of wool, but also that unnecessary disturbance and damage would be caused to the woollen industry.

With the sole exception of Great Britain, the wool importing and manufacturing States are unanimous in declaring that anthrax contracted by handling wool
is extremely rare or unknown in their countries. For the most part the wools imported are those of Europe, Australasia, and the South American States, with regard to which there is considerable evidence—supported by the British Departmental Committee of 1913—that they are to all intents and purposes free from anthrax.

Some of the States principally concerned in the manufacture of these wools are also of the opinion that the process of disinfection proposed would be harmful to their woollen industry if applied to all wools. An essential feature of the process described in the Questionnaire (p. 19) is washing, and it is pointed out—especially by Germany and Switzerland—that washing would make very difficult, if not impossible, the careful sorting which is indispensable to the industries manufacturing fine woollen goods.

The first modification, therefore, which it would appear to be necessary to make to the scheme of the Questionnaire, is the substitution for the principle of the compulsory disinfection of all wools, of the principle of the compulsory disinfection of wools suspected of infection with anthrax spores by reason of their origin in countries in which it is proved that anthrax is prevalent.

This principle has been adopted in the proposed Draft Convention printed at the end of this Report. By providing that only such wools as are included in a "Schedule of Suspected Wools" shall be subject to the principle of compulsory disinfection, it would appear that the principal objection is overcome. The
burden of expenditure is reduced to the minimum consistent with providing for the measures necessary to ensure the protection against anthrax which it is the object of the Convention to supply. Since, moreover, as will be seen below, it is proposed to provide in Article 6 that the organisation of disinfection shall be entrusted to the States desirous of exporting or importing dangerous wools, it follows that the expense will have to be borne by the Governments immediately concerned.

Question No. 2. — The sixteen replies which have been received may be classified thus: Affirmative 14; Negative 1; Alternative 1.

Of the Governments whose replies are favourable to disinfection in the ports of exporting countries there are several which consider that the organisation of disinfection in the ports of importing countries should be recognised in the event of it being found impracticable to carry out disinfection in all cases in the exporting ports. Further, one Government (Roumania) considers that regard should be paid, when fixing the places at which disinfection should be organised, to the places, if any, at which disinfecting plant has already been installed.

Whilst, therefore, there may be said to be almost complete agreement with the suggestion that disinfection should take place in the ports of exporting countries, wherever possible, there would appear to be an important body of opinion in favour of making it optional to organise disinfection either in the exporting or importing ports.
The principal reason for the adoption of this proposal is to be found in the fact, to which reference is made by the Government of India, that the dangerous kinds of wool are drawn from a wide area—in some cases from countries which have no very competent administrative system—and find their way to Europe by a variety of routes. The Government of India consider that it cannot be expected that disinfecting stations will be established in all the ports from which these wools may be dispatched. At present a considerable amount of this dangerous wool from Central Asia passes through Indian ports, but the Government of India are of opinion that an attempt to apply the principle of disinfection before export at these ports would only result in the dislocation of India's export trade, since the wools concerned would probably be diverted to other and uncontrolled channels. Unless, therefore, it were possible to apply the principle rigorously and all round, the Government of India consider that no advantage to the importing countries would be secured.

It might perhaps be contended that the tendency for suspected wools to filter through uncontrolled ports would be met by the absolute prohibition to import and transport such wool unless it were certified to have been disinfected in the exporting country. But certain Governments principally interested in the exportation and importation of these classes of wools are not prepared to agree to the complete adoption of this measure. The British Departmental Committee of 1913 considered that it might be necessary to establish disinfecting stations at British ports.
to deal with wool which escapes treatment in the exporting countries, and the British Government, in their reply, also take the view that, if, and in so far as, disinfection is impracticable in the producing or exporting countries, it should be carried out at selected ports in the importing countries. Moreover, the British Government has already given practical effect to this idea by the establishment of an experimental disinfecting station at its principal port of entry, Liverpool.

A graver objection to the admission of the principle of option in the matter of organising disinfection in the exporting or importing ports lies in the fact that a large class of workers who handle wool would be left outside the sphere of protection, viz. the transport workers. This objection is, however, more of a theoretical than of a practical nature and loses much of its force through the circumstance that cases of anthrax contracted by transport workers as a result of handling wool are comparatively rare.

The possibility of organising disinfection at importing ports has, therefore, been accepted in Article 5 of the proposed Draft Convention, but at the same time it is clearly indicated that disinfection in the exporting country is to be preferred and should be carried out wherever possible.

A further provision has been introduced to meet the point raised by Roumania and also the case of countries which import wool across their land frontiers for exportation via their ports. It is proposed that disinfection may take place at suitable collecting centres, nearer to the points of origin of the wool,
in the countries of origin or the exporting countries. In cases of this kind, however, it is considered that measures should be taken to prevent re-infection en route.

Question No. 3. — The fifteen replies which have been received may be grouped as follows: Affirmative 3; Affirmative with reservations 5; Negative with reservations 2; Negative 3; Action reserved 1; Indefinite 1.

Here again the reservations relate almost exclusively to the scope of the prohibition to import and the objections appear to be removed by the general limitation of the field of operation of the proposed Draft Convention to suspected wools.

Accordingly it is proposed to include in Article 7 of the Draft Convention a provision concerning the prohibition of the importation of wools inscribed in the "Schedule of Suspected Wools", unless the Member is satisfied that such wool has been efficiently disinfected at the exporting port or unless it has made arrangements to secure its efficient disinfection at the importing port. The proposal to include in the prohibition the transport of non-disinfected wool from an exporting to an importing country has not been maintained in the draft, owing to the acceptance, referred to above, of the alternative of disinfection in the importing port.

Question No. 4. — The sixteen replies to this question may be thus classified: Affirmative 6; Affirmative with reservations 4; Negative with reservations 1; Negative 5.
It will be recalled that Question No. 4 enumerated; under the letters (a) to (f), a series of tasks which might be undertaken by an International Commission. The reservations which have been formulated relate to certain of these tasks and especially to those defined under (c) and (d). It would seem to be feared by some Governments that an organisation possessing these powers would be liable to trespass on the domain of national sovereignty, and that they would involve expenditure out of all proportion to the purposes which might be served by such a Commission. The opposition to the constitution of an International Commission which is offered by five States would also appear to be generally based on the same consideration, in view of the alternative proposals put forward by the French and Norwegian Committees which prepared the answers forwarded by the Governments of these two countries.

The proposal to establish an International Anthrax Commission has therefore been maintained in the proposed Draft Convention (Article 2) but with more limited functions than those suggested in the Questionnaire, and with a composition more adapted to its purposes (see below under Question No. 5).

With regard to the task defined under (a): This proposal has been maintained, and, in view of the fact that the application of the provision relating to disinfection is limited to suspected wools, the drawing up of the "Schedule of Suspected Wools" may be regarded as one of the main duties of the Commission. It is generally accepted by the Governments that a Schedule of this kind is necessary and it would
appear that it could best be drawn up by an International Commission composed of experts nominated by the interested Governments themselves, such as is here proposed.

Provision is made for the notification to the States concerned of any proposal to place classes of wool exported by them on this Schedule, and to give them an opportunity of making such communications as they may wish to make upon the proposal to the Commission.

With regard to (b), (c) and (d) : Whilst a certain number of Governments have declared themselves prepared to entrust some or all of the duties therein enumerated to an International Commission, it is felt that it would be more in accordance with the general wishes of the Governments, expressed or implied, to leave these questions to be regulated by the States concerned themselves. Hence, it is proposed to provide, in Article 6, that the duty of making the necessary regulations and arrangements shall be left to the individual States which desire to export or import wools included in the "Schedule of Suspected Wools."

In accordance with the advisory character of the Commission, no provision is made for control of any kind to be exercised by the Commission itself. Nevertheless, it has been considered that some kind of guarantee of the efficiency of the methods of disinfection should be furnished to the other Members which ratify the Convention. For this purpose an Article (Article 8) has been inserted in the proposed Draft Convention, which provides that no method of
disinfection shall be considered to be efficient unless in a standard test the anthrax spores are completely destroyed. It is further provided that the Commission shall study and report on the best methods of carrying out such standard tests. It is obvious that the characteristics of such a test may vary with the progress of science, but the following definition may be given provisionally:

"No method of disinfection shall be considered to be efficient unless in a standard test the anthrax spores of known resisting powers contained in standard infected test material are completely destroyed.

Standard infected test material shall be prepared in the laboratory and consist of wool or hair clotted together by naturally dried coagulated blood, or similar material, which has been impregnated whilst liquid with an approximately known large number of anthrax spores of known high vitality and resisting powers.

A standard test means a test carried out under complete chemical and bacteriological control, in which standard infected test material is, together with a relatively large quantity of material requiring disinfection, submitted under practical working conditions to the action of the method of disinfection under test."

It is further suggested, although it has not been included in the proposed Draft Convention, that each Member which ratifies the Convention should agree to make a report to the International Anthrax Com-
mission on the methods employed in carrying out such standard tests, and the results thereof, at such intervals as shall be fixed by the Commission. These reports should be communicated by the Commission to the other Members which ratify the Convention.

The tasks defined under (e) and (f) have been retained, but in a somewhat different form. Control of the organisation and methods of disinfection have been left to the States themselves. It was felt that the Commission might reasonably be charged with the task of: (1) investigating and reporting upon efficient methods of disinfection and transport; (2) reporting, at the request of a State concerned, on any new method proposed to be adopted; (3) enquiring, with the consent of the State concerned, into any complaint that the system of disinfection adopted by such State is inefficient. Further, in view of the undoubted importance of combating anthrax amongst the animals themselves, and the references made by various Governments to the matter in their replies, it is proposed to add to the tasks of the Commission that of reporting on the prevalence of anthrax in the countries of origin, and the measures taken for the prevention of the disease.

These provisions are to be found in Article 2, paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the proposed Draft Convention.

Question No. 5. — Twelve Governments have replied to this question: Affirmative 2; Affirmative with reservations 3; Alternatives 5; Negative 1; No opinion 1.
The reservations and the alternatives are alike directed to the same point; that the International Anthrax Commission should be composed of experts nominated by the Governments of the importing and exporting countries concerned. This composition would appear to be more suited to the advisory character which it is proposed to give to the Commission. The question as to which States should be entitled to representation on the Commission is one of some difficulty. Provisionally, it has been considered that it should be left to the States which ratify the Draft Convention to take the initiative in applying for representation; the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, subject to reference to the General Conference, to decide whether the applicant Government is, or is not, reasonably entitled to representation.

* * *

To resume: the guiding principle which has been followed in drawing up the proposed Draft Convention has been conciliation of the difficulties and objections raised by the Governments in their replies with the general scheme proposed in the Questionnaire. As it stands, the proposed Draft Convention is based upon the following principles:

(1) The disinfection of wools suspected of infection with anthrax spores by reason of their origin in countries in which anthrax is proved, to the satisfaction of an International Commission of experts, to be prevalent; the machinery of disinfection and
the necessary regulations to be set up by the States concerned themselves.

(2) The appointing of an International Anthrax Commission with powers of an advisory character and composed of experts nominated in the proportion of one per country by the exporting and importing States; expenses to be borne in equal proportions by Members represented on the Commission.

(3) The prohibition of the importation of suspected wools which have not been efficiently disinfected either before export, wherever possible, or in the port of entry in the importing country.

Finally, it should be added that two further Articles have been included (Articles 1 and 9), which are respectively of an interpretative and administrative character. Article 1 defines the term "wool" as sheep's wool, camel hair, and goat hair, animal fibres which enter commonly into the composition of manufactured woollen goods. It is clear that these categories by no means exhaust the list of animal products which frequently act as carriers of anthrax germs. Cases of anthrax not infrequently occur through handling horsehair, bristles, etc. It may be pointed out that the process of disinfection proposed was considered by the British Departmental Committee of 1913 to be equally suitable for adoption in the case of horsehair. Nevertheless, owing to the terms of the item on the Agenda, viz. the disinfection of wool infected with anthrax spores, the scope of the proposed Draft Convention has been limited to those products which are ordinarily grouped under the expression "wool".

Article 1 also defines the term "exporting country"
as the country from the ports of which wool is despatched. It appeared that there was a possibility of confusion of meaning between the term "country of origin" and the term "exporting country", which it was important to remove by definition.

The purpose of Article 9 is twofold. The first paragraph provides that there should not be undue delay between the date of coming into force of the Convention and the date on which the International Anthrax Commission should commence its activities. It further provides that the ratifications of at least three Members should be necessary before the Convention can come into force. The second paragraph is designed to leave sufficient time for the ratifying Members to make the necessary arrangements for carrying out their obligations, and to permit the International Anthrax Commission to do certain preliminary work in preparation for the entry into operation of the whole Convention.
CHAPTER III.

TEXT OF DRAFT FOR A CONVENTION.

The International Labour Office submits for the consideration of the Conference the following draft for a Convention concerning the disinfection of wool infected with anthrax spores:

Article 1.

For the purpose of this Convention the term "wool" includes sheeps' wool, camel hair and goat hair.

For the purpose of this Convention the term "exporting country" shall be deemed to mean the country from the ports of which wool is despatched.

Article 2.

An International Anthrax Commission shall be appointed for the following purposes:

(a) To draw up a schedule of wools suspected of infection with anthrax spores, hereinafter referred to as the "Schedule of Suspected Wools", which shall be revised as often as the Commission may deem advisable and in any case at least once in every three years. The Governments of States exporting any class of wool which it is proposed to include in the "Schedule of Suspected Wools" shall be notified of such proposal, and shall be given such opportunity as the Commission may deem advisable to make a
statement by representatives or otherwise before the Commission.

(b) To investigate and report upon efficient methods of disinfection and arrangements for the transport of wool.

(c) At the request of any State Member concerned to report upon any new method of disinfection which the State concerned may desire to adopt.

(d) To enquire into and consider, with the consent of the State concerned, any complaint that the system of disinfection in such State is not efficient.

(e) To report from time to time on the prevalence of anthrax in the countries of origin and the measures taken for prevention of the disease.

Article 3.

This Commission shall be composed of technical experts nominated by the exporting and importing countries specified by the Governing Body in accordance with the provisions of this Article in the proportion of one to each country.

Should a Member desire to be represented on the Commission it shall forward a reasoned application for such representation.

Any State which has ratified the Convention and which is not satisfied with the decision of the Governing Body in its regard may bring the matter before the General Conference.

Article 4.

The expenses of the Commission shall be borne in equal proportions by the Members represented on the Commission.
Article 5.

All wools classified as wools suspected of infection with anthrax spores and included in the "Schedule of Suspected Wools" provided for in Article 2 of this Convention shall be disinfected wherever possible at the ports of the exporting countries. Where disinfec-
tion is organised at points in the exporting countries or countries of origin other than the exporting ports, regulations to prevent re-infection shall be made under the terms of Article 6 of this Convention. Where it is not possible to organise disinfection in the exporting country, disinfection may be organised in the importing ports of States desirous of importing such wools.

Article 6.

The regulations concerning the organisation, supervision and control of such disinfection, and the choice of methods thereof, shall be made by the Governments of the States desirous of exporting or importing such suspected wools.

Article 7.

Each Member which ratifies this Convention engages to prohibit the importation of wools included in the "Schedule of Suspected Wools" unless it is satisfied that such wool has been efficiently disinfected at the exporting port, or unless it has made arrangements to secure its efficient disinfection at the importing port.

Article 8.

No method of disinfection shall be considered to be
efficient unless in a standard test the anthrax spores are completely destroyed.

The methods which may be employed in making such a standard test and the conditions necessary to ensure complete chemical and bacteriological control shall be studied by the International Anthrax Commission and communicated to the Members concerned.

Article 9.

The International Anthrax Commission set up by Article 2 of this Convention shall meet in first session not later than six months after the date upon which this Convention comes into force. This Convention shall come into force at the date on which the ratification of three Members shall have been registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

No Member shall, however, as a result of the Convention, be obliged to apply the provisions of Articles 5, 6 and 7 before the expiration of a period of one year from the date of the first session of the International Anthrax Commission or such other period as may be fixed by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office on the advice of the International Anthrax Commission.